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Abstract
In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading
posts would be just.ified if it were true that the set o( equilibria is not affected by the
number of trading posts postulated at the outset of the model. We show that this
is not true. We develop an example which features equilibria where a commodity is
simultaneously exchanged in two trading posts at different prices, i.e., equilibria where
the 'la,w of one price' fails when the one to one correspondence between commodities
and trading posts is abandoned. Thus, we conclude that the set of equilibria in market
games depends non-trivially on the number of trading posts. This conclusion further
suggests that an explanation of the structure of trading posts is necessary.
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Strategic market games have provided an elegant formulation of imperfectly com-
petitive exchange. The standard setup of these models -see [2] [7] [8]- is based
on the concept of trading posts where individuals submit orders for purchases and
sales of commodities. An allocation rule then distributes commodities to individ-
uals according to their bids as well as the aggregate offers and bids that reach
each post. In this way commodity holdings of individuals depend on the whole
profile of bid-offer strategies of all agents in each post.
It is noteworthy that market games feature exactly one post for each
commodity'. In this way there is a one to one correspondence between commodity
types, trading posts and conunodity prices. On a closer look the identification
of trading posts with commodity types is a hypothesis, which has one important
consequence: all individuals wishing to trade a commodity must do so in one (and
the sarne) trading post, i.e., all bids and offers for a commodity are aggregated at
a single trading post. Contrast this with a situation where a commodity may be
exchanged, say against a numeraire, in more than one posts. In such a case, in-
dividuals would }tave available a richer variety of strategies, that includes buying
a commodity in some trading posts and selling it in others. Another conceivable
configuration oí net trades, is the partition of the set of agents in the economy into
subsets trading a commodity in different posts. Thus, we are compelled to ques-
tion whether or not the set of market game equilibria depends on the structure of
trading posts postulated at the outset.
As the reader rnay have guessed, what we are about to suggest in this paper
is the idea of nrultiple trading posts for commodities. What we have in mind is
a model with possibly rnore than one trading post where each commodity can
be traded against a numeraire and prices as well as net trades in different posts
are calcrilated independently from one another. In this case one may end up
with a set of equilibria that cannot be captured by the original model. When
trade is perfectly competitive this issue does not arise because the structure of
net t.rades is immaterial in a competitive equilibrium, so the market structure is
of no consequence for the set of competitive equilibria.
The issue raised here may be viewed as a robustness test of the market game
with respect to the structure of trading posts. The key idea is to abandon the one
to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts. If it turned
out that the one to one correspondence between prices and commodity types (i.e.,
the 'law of one price') is valid regardfess of the number of trading posts, then
we wordd have a proof that the model with a single trading post per commodity
is robust: the structure of trading posts is immaterial. 'The implication of this
would be that the concept of trading posts does not need further elaboration. If it
turned out that the contrary is true, i.e., if the 'law of one price' fails, then we are
faced with a meaningful extension of the modeL Such a conclusion would suggest,
br one post for each pair of commodiries as in [1] or Shapley's window model which is
analyzecl in [6].
1among other things, that some careful clarification of trading posts is necessary.
In either case, the investigation of such an extension seems worthwhile.
Iu this paper we show by means of an exarnple that, in fact, the imperfectly
competitive general equilibrium model is not robust in the above sense. Our ex-
ample features an equilibrium where a commodity is exchanged against another
in two trading posts simultaneously, at different prices. As a conclusion, there is
an equilibrium strategy configuration in this examplez that cannot be captured
by the market game with a single trading post. Moreover, we show that the al-
location produced by this eqttilibrium strategy profile is not even feasible via a
single trading post. Surprisingly enough, in this equilibrium the liquidity con-
straints are not binding. The emergence of unequal prices in equilibrium is due
to the imperfectly competitive conditions of exchange: a contemplated effort of
an individual to take advantage of the price difference by shifting orders from
one post to another involves price effects. Thus, the primary effect of a shift of
an infinitesimal order to another post is accompanied by an opposite effect that
comes through the change in prices that this shift will produce. The key idea
is that this price effect can be detrimental for the benefits of any shift of orders
across posts.
In order to keep things in perspective, the failure of the law of one price that
we advocate here should not be confused with the appearance of inconsistent
prices in [1~. In that model the authors study a market game with a trading post
(and a corresponding price) for each pair of commodities and conclude that the
exchange prices between a triple of goods may be inconsistent. Here we discuss
the possibility of different prices for a commodity traded in different posts against
each other. In order to highlight the difference, the extension of the model in
[I] (or Shapley's window model for that matter) that captures the issue at hand,
would be to add more trading posts for some pair of contmodities.
l?pon departure from the cont.ext of a single post per commodity the number
of posts becomes ambiguous, because any number would be just as arbitrary.
Ideally, we would like trading posts to somehow arise endogenously. However, as
the purpose of this paper is to justify the introduction of multiple posts rather than
suggest a specific number, we focus on a minimal model with two commodities
which can be exchanged for one another in two posts.
We apply our extension to a model suggested in (7~. However, similar exten-
sions are conceivable in other species of market games as well3. The next section
introduces a bare bones model that captures the issue at hand. In section three
we develop an example that establishes the possibility of multiple prices for a
commodity. Finally, some discussion and concluding remarks follow in sections
four and five.
'The robustness of our example will be e~ ident in the sequel.
3For a similar extension of the model appcaring in [5] and in [4], the reader is directed to [3].
22 The model
We present here a multiple posts version of the model in [7]. Let H- ~lí, L, Af }
be a set of agents. 'fhere are two commodity types in the econorny and the
consumption set of each agent is identified with ~2t. Each individual h E H is
characterized by an initial endowment eA E~J2tt and a C2, strictly concave and
strictly monotonic utility fuuction uA :~t -~ ~i. We postulat.e two trading posts
labeled r and s. Each consumer can offer (6h, 6n) cmits of commodity 1 and~or offer
(qn.9n) units of commodity '2 in the two posts. The strategy set of each agent
h E H iS thnS :~~h -{(bh.bh,qh~qh) E~} : bh } bh C eh~ qA f qh C Eh}. FOr a
glVen a Strategy pCOfile, define for each j- r, s: B' -~hEN b'h~ Q' -~hEF19h~
B'-h -~k~A ~ al~d Q'h-~t~n q'k. Transactions in each trading post clear
through the price p' - B~~Q~. Each h E H receiveszh - eh~-qh.p~-{-qh.p'-bh-bh
units of commodity I and rh - eh - 9n - 4n ~ bn~PT f 6hIP' units of commodity
2, where divisions over zero are taken to equal zero. Consumers are viewed as
solving the following problem:
max u(rA)
(óh.vn~ESn
S.t . rh-eh}qh' ijr}qÁ'~,-bh-bn (1)
~G Qr Q,
rn - en - 4n - 4é ~ bn ' B, t bn ' B,
An equilibrium is defined simply as a Nash equilibrium in bid-offer strategies. An
equilibrium of tlte market game is termed interior if each agent is solving (1) in
the interior of SA. For such equilibria we have the following elementary facts:
Fact 2.1 In an interior equilibriunt, the príces ín the turo trading posts s and r,
musf ..atisjy the jo!lotving (aon-arbitrageJ condítion:
(P')2 - B-A ' Q-A '(Pr)2, b'h E H
Q~h BTh
Proo,~
The first order conditions of (1) at an interior eyuilibrium are:
QT h aah B~-hQT C~itA
- Q' 8r~, } (B')2 t3:rh
Q~~ A C~7lA B' hQ~ Ó2lA
- Q' Ó:P;, } ( B')~ BT,~,
BrQrA CJtIA Br A Ó2~A
(Qr)2 (~rh - Br C~2h
B'Q' A C~uA B' A (~llh







3Notice that (5) and (6) are the same as (3) and (4) respectively. Fiu-thermore,
the system of (3) and (4) can be written in matrix form as:
Q A. 4~
-n -h 8u
~ ~~ - Q` I B') n ~
Q-n H'-n4' 3~ - Q '~ ~rn





which implies that (2) is satisfied ~
Fact 2.2 Under the assumptions ntade on preferences the su,~cient second order
condilions of (1J are alurays satisfted at an interior equilibráum.
Proof
From eyuations (3)-(6) it is obvious that the rank of the matrix of second order
derivatives of the objective function in (1) is equal to 2. Define:
d~uh a~uh B-h (B')~ a2uh B'n (B')~ Í ~ A - (a~n), - ~ ~ aTha~~ ~ Q~h ~ (Q~)~ ~ (a.~h)2 ~ ~4ah ~ (Q~)~l
Notice that A G 0. Furthermore, given (2)-(4), we have that the determinants




C72tlh ~rh 2 Ó71n B~hQT ~H~~- l .A-2.-. c0
(Ub;,)1 - Q' I d.rh (gr)3
a~rrh a~T~h d~~~h ~
(~bh)~ (86h)~ - ~8bnhh~
Q~ h 2..4 - l -~u ~} B' nQ~
~ Q~ ~ nih (B QrnQ~" A QrQa
2
(Q~" .A-'2-a~.~ ` Q" ~ dsn (B')
Q' h4' n. A
Q'Q'
~ 0 (8)
~1i3~ - ~H~,~ - 0.
Thus, at any point where the first order conditions are satisfied the ma-
trix of second order derivatives of the objective function is negative semidefinite
0
The crucial observation is that, according to the above facts, unequal prices
may occur in eyuilihrium in as much as it is algebraicly possible to find a strategy
profile so that:
,
-r.~ -n~ B-L Q-L B-hr Q-M ~ 1
Q~ ~~ BT 1`" - Q~ L BT L- Q~ hl BT M
This observation has inspired the example that follows in the next section.
~3 Equilibria with multiple prices
3.1 An Example
The example that follows features an equilibrium with two distinct positive prices
for a commodity. This establishes the failure of the 'law of one price' when one
allows for multiple trading posts. In constructing our example we proceed as
follows: we construct a profile of strategies that satisfies (2) and then look for
endowments and utility functions for which this profile of strategies is indeed a
Nash equilibriurn. To this end, consider the following profile of strategies:
- r(lOlz 5 (lOlz 3 ( IOIz 1~
(6;,,6'c'bnr) 1`l 9 J 9~ l 9 J 9' l 9 J 9
r 1 2




In this way we have:
z .
p'- ~9~ -~ and p'-9 sothat p~ - 9~1
` P
Remark 3.1 It is worthwhile noticing that the aggregate quantities submitted
to each post are equal: Qr - 5- Q'.
~Ve now turn to look for endowments and utility functions that validate the
above profile as a Nash eyuilibrium. We begin by specifying endowments as
follows:
Eh. eh.





55 r10 z 85
]ti `9~ '18
13 (10l z 41
12 `9 J ' 6
4 10 z ~IO
8-45~9~'9~
Remark 3.2 Observe that for this specification of endowments the liquidity con-
straints are non-binding for the proposed strategy profile.
In this way, for the profile of strategies under consideration the allocation of
commodities across agents turns out as follows:
~~i,-,sh~ - (3,~)
(s~,~~) - (~,4)
(~M, ~M) - (8, 4)
.5We now look for utility functions that will serve our purpose. We should find
a utility fwiction (C'2, strictly concave, monotonic) for each individual, such that
equation ( 3) is satisfied when evaluated at the proposed profile. In view of the
fact that the strateg}~ profile in question satisfies (2) by construction, equations
(4)-(6) will automatically be satisfied. Moreover, by virtue of fact 2.2 this will
suffice to ensure that the proposed profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium one. Thus,
we look for a solntion to the following equations:
8uh (3,8) - 9 dur,-
3 H
t7r~. 4 ~ azF. ( , )
.,
ás~ (2,a) - ~ . á~` (~,~) ~ z
L L




If we look for a solution in the class oí functions: uti (xh,.rn) -(Tn)ah -(zn)~-a~
for h - Ií,L,,A1, we find that eyuations (9)-(11) are satisfied for aF- - 27~59,
a~ -'?ï~35 and a,tif - 9~10.
Remark 3.3 The constructive process that we followed makes it clear that our
exatnple is robust with respect to the choices of utility functions and endowments.
Finally, we show that the equilibrium allocation calculated above can not be
achieced in the single trading post model. Let Z~ - x), - eh where i- 1, 2 and
h- lí, L, b~l be the net trades of each agent. Notice that the net trades which are
achievable with a single trading post, must satisfy zh --p . zh for some clearing
price p. [n other words in order to be feasible in the single trading post model, a
collection ot pairs of (nonzero) net trades must satisfy:
~i ,i i
`h' `L -hf
,2 - ,.2 - ,2 '
`6 -L `Af
It can be readily checked that the net trades in the equilibrium allocation calcu-
lated above do not satisfy this set of equations, so it can not be achieved via a
single trading post.
3.2 Discussion of the example
P'or sure, the type of eyuilibria demonstrated in the example above, validate our
suspicion that the structure of trading posts matters. On the other hand such
equilibria seem odd, because they assign different values to the same commodity,
according to which trading post it is traded. In the absence of some friction,
conventional wisdom would suggest that if prices were unequal then an individual
would find it profitable to shift purchases (sales) from a more (less) expensive
post to a less (more) expensive~ one. In this way prices in the two posts would
6change accordingly so that in equilibrium prices would be equal. However, in
an imperfectly competitive setup this conventional wisdom fails! The reason is
that in the imperfectly competitive context, shifts of orders across posts involve a
'price effect'. In this way infinitesimal 'shifts' of bids and offers across posts may
change prices in a way that they are unfavorable to a consumer. Indeed prices do
change in the 'right' direction to close the gap but, as the movement of prices is
simultaneous, the relative rraagnitudeof those changes may be such that it renders
tmfavorable a shiít of bids (offers) from a more (less) expensive post towards a less
(more) expensive one. The intuition of the example can be easily grasped in this
way: if an agent reallocated some of the bid in the expensive post to the cheaper
one, the price in the expensive post would fall and at the same time the price
in the cheaper one would rise. In this way a higher price would have to be paid
not only for the marginal unit but for all the units purchased from the cheaper
post. Thus, the direct effect of shifting a part the bid is followed by an adverse
indirect effect due to the price change. If this price effect is severe enough the net
effect can be unfavorable. It is the absence of this price effect that validates the
preceding argument in the competitive case. Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning
that unlike the results in [1], the appearance of such equilibria here is not due to
liquidity constraints.
4 Conclusion
We hope that the arguments in this paper have convinced the reader that the
structure of trading posts in market games is essential. In view oí this, the central
message of this paper is that the concept of trading posts needs further clarifica-
tion. The Arrow-Debreu description of an economy, being directed to the study of
competitive equilibria where market institutions are irrelevant, does not suggest
any particular structure oí trading posts, so it is hard to decide how many posts
sltould be allowed at the outset. Ultimately, a model where trading posts evolve,
rather than being postulated, would resolve the issues raised here. Apparently,
this will reyuire some new insight as one would have to model more primitive con-
cepts that would spark some life into trading posts. In lack of such an insight we
propose a model with an infinite number of posts per commodity. In this way the
number of (active) trading posts would probably vary across eyuilibria, but such
a framework would certainly capture the equilibria of all possible configurations
of trading posts.
On the other hand the possibility of a'price distribution' for a commodity, as
opposed to one price per commodity, seems interesting for a number of reasons.
For one, it demonstrates that the lack of perfect competition can endogenously
explain price disparities across markets or equilibrium with arbitrage. An imme-
diate conclusion that can be drawn from our example is that the law of one price
entails perfectly competitive conditions of exchange. Furthermore, it adds a new
dimension to the asymptotic convergence to competitive equilibria: in order to
7obtain equivalence with competitiveequilibria via a model with multiple posts per
commodity, it would be necessnry that possible disparities of commodity prices
in different. trading posts tend to zero. Finally, given the possibility of eyuilibri-
a with non-uniform priees for commodities, the introduction of multiple trading
posts for conunodities seems to provide an attractive context for the use of Nash
equilibrium refinements.
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